Let's review BeyondCorp's four core pillars: Pillar One: Device identityĭevice identity is a cornerstone of BeyondCorp strategy.Įach user device has to be registered within the inventory and identified with a strong cryptographic primitive - a security module. In BeyondCorp design, only users with verified identities and trusted devices can access registered services through an identity-aware proxy with centralized access control. In this post, I will first revisit the core pillars of both BeyondCorp and the ZTA strategy memo, then compare these pillars with Teleport's capabilities. government's ZTA strategy memo, it is a good time to review how Teleport implements and extends both the BeyondCorp and ZTA. Teleport has grown a lot in the past few years. The security strategy behind Teleport's product has always been to improve both the speed and security of developer access to infrastructure while adhering to the core concept of BeyondCorp and zero trust architecture. We launched Teleport as an open-source project in 2015 to help engineers secure access to their infrastructure. Since then engineers' workflow and infrastructure environments have evolved, and the security and operational model around which BeyondCorp was first designed in 2014 is no longer sufficient. What works for Google surely works for most use cases, at least at the infrastructure operation level. Although the memo focuses on government agencies, it has a clear structure and strong foundations that apply to any modern company.īeyondCorp is the first real-world implementation of the zero trust architecture for access control at large scale. Zero trust has been hyped up in recent years, and with the release of a memorandum discussing federal Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) strategies, zero trust has entered mainstream at the government level. As soon as an attacker breaches the perimeter, they have unrestricted access to the resources. In response, Google initiated a perimeter-less and trustless access control system now popularly known as BeyondCorp.īeyondCorp comes from a realization that VPN perimeter network security is obsolete. Operation Aurora targeted high-profile companies such as Google, Adobe, Akamai, Rackspace, etc., with said primary reason of modifying the source codes. That's how Google described its perimeter-based security in the aftermath of Operation Aurora. "Crunchy on the outside, chewy in the middle". I’ll write a follow-up post on the complexity I seem to struggle with when using protobufs and gRPC. Because I’m more familiar with Golang and because I’ve written (most) other Trillian personalities in Golang, I resorted to quickly implementing Crate Transparency in Golang too in order to uncover bugs with the Rust implementation. I’ve been lazy thanks to the excellent gRPCurl and have been using it way of a client. And, by way of a first for me, for the gRPC server implementation (aka “personality”). I discussed this project earlier this month Rust Crate Transparency & Rust SDK for Google Trillian and and earlier approach for Python’s packages with pypi-transparency. This time, Rust’s Crates often found in crates.io which is Rust’s Package Registry. As appears to be my fixation, this personality is for another package manager. I’ve been hacking on a Rust-based transparent application for Google Trillian.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |